I. Introduction
Franchising has become a ubiquitous form of ownership in the US. Through franchising, a new owner can benefit from the reputation of an established brand. At the same time, the franchisor benefits from the capital provided by franchisees as well as from their entrepreneurial energy. The rapid growth of franchising over the last thirty years has been accompanied by an extensive theoretical and empirical literature regarding its benefits, agency problems, and performance consequences (for example, Caves and Murphy's (1976) and Rubin's (1978) seminal articles).
Franchising, however, raises distinctive agency problems. Franchisors benefit financially from increased revenues of all outlets including franchisees' outlets because franchisees pay royalties and advertising fees linked to revenues as opposed to profits whereas franchisees seek to maximize profits of their own outlets. Differences in the two entities' investments in branding also create agency tensions. Although the franchisee has some stake in the brand, it is not as great as that of the franchisor. Accordingly, a franchisee has incentives to free-ride on the established brand reputation and may be willing to cut corners to reduce costs, even if the behavior has negative consequences for the franchisor.
A great deal of theoretical and empirical work has looked at agency effects on pricing, promotion, and cost control strategy under franchising. Yet surprisingly little empirical work explores how divergent agency interests impact business behaviors with social consequences.
With the exception of recent work by Jin and Leslie (2009) regarding its effects on restaurant hygiene, few have investigated how divergent incentives between franchisors and franchisees lead to significant differences in compliance with public policies regarding labor and environment. Labor and workplace policies are particularly of interest because franchising is concentrated in industries like restaurants and hotels that employ a large number of low wage workers. For example, franchising is most common in the food and drinking industry, accounting for 36 percent of all franchised establishments (FranData 2000, Table 4 -1). The sector also employs a disproportionately large share of low wage workers: although 6.2 percent of total US employment works in food services, it accounts for an estimated 12.5 percent of all low-wage workers (Osterman 2008) . Recent surveys by Bernhardt et al. (2009) reveal widescale violations of labor standards regulations in these industries, in particular of minimum wage and overtime standards.
Franchisees who typically own and manage their own outlets seek to maximize the profit of only their units whereas the franchisor benefits from increases in sales of all outlets in the chain, whether franchised or company-owned units. Franchisors are therefore more concerned about the deterioration of brand reputation because it potentially affects sales in all units via consumers' perceptions of the brand. 1 In addition to diverging interests in brand reputation that may induce free riding behavior, franchisees have other reasons to comply less than franchisors with workplace regulations. First, a franchisee's probability of being caught from violating labor standards requirements is likely lower than the franchisor's because franchisees own far fewer outlets than franchisors. Second, franchisors may face greater monitoring problems than franchisees because Given this, company-owned units managed by franchisors have a greater incentive to comply with workplace regulations relative to franchised units where franchisees are likely to exert relatively less effort to comply. 1 To illustrate, imagine an individual fast food outlet along a major interstate highway. The franchisee who owns the outlet may be willing to cut corners in terms of service quality by hiring lower quality employees if he/she believes that the majority of its customers represent non-repeat business (e.g. most customers simply drive by on the highway and will not return). Although the franchisee might benefit from increased profits due to lower labor costs, the poor service experience at that outlet may lead customers to avoid the restaurant elsewhere, thus hurting the franchisor. For a discussion of this issue, see Lafontaine and Slade (1998) ; Lafontaine and Kaufmann (1994) ; Lafontaine and Shaw (1999; 2005) . managers at company-owned outlets receive fixed salaries and therefore have lower-powered incentives to supervise their employees. To address this agency problem, franchisors tend to provide their employees with higher efficiency wages (Krueger, 1991) . On the other hand, as both owner and manager, franchisees have lower incentives to pay an efficiency wage. Finally, franchisees have a different profit function from franchisors because they pay a portion of their revenues to the franchisors and therefore focus on cost savings. This gives franchisees incentives to hire less productive workers at the expense of revenues or to violate minimum wage or overtime requirements. All of these reasons would lead to lower compliance at franchisee-owned outlets than at comparable company-owned outlets.
This paper examines the effect of franchise ownership on compliance with labor standards regulations in the U.S. We show how comparative ownership incentives lead to substantially lower compliance at franchisee-owned outlets than at company-owned outlets. To estimate the impact of franchising on compliance, we focus on the twenty largest national restaurant chains in the fast food industry. The Top 20 brands' outlets represent a significant portion of the eating and drinking industry, and franchising plays a major role in the sector.
More importantly, there are high rates of non-compliance in this sector, as well as a large number of workers with hourly earnings close to the minimum wage, and there is significant variation in franchise versus company ownership across the Top 20 brands. This provides us with the necessary variation for comparing the compliance level of company-owned outlets with that of franchisee-owned outlets. In addition, the Top 20 brands are a good fit for studying compliance incentives arising from brand reputation because they are likely to be more sensitive to reputational effects than smaller or localized franchisors.
By using a unique pooled cross-section of outlet-level enforcement-data from the U.S.
Department of Labor for the Top 20 brands' restaurants in the U.S., we observe that total backwages (wage repayment equal to the difference between those actually received and those owed to workers by statute) found per investigation at a given franchised outlet are, at least, $4,265 larger than at a comparable company-owned outlet. This is roughly four times average backwages. The franchise ownership effect becomes stronger with the use of the relevant instrument for franchising status, which adjusts for the effects of omitted bias due to missing factors that affect franchising decision and compliance level. Instrumental variable estimates are about 2.5 times greater than the corresponding franchise ownership effects. These ownership effects also hold with two alternative compliance measures. Moreover, we find that all but the very largest multi-unit franchisees owe much larger back-wages than company-owned outlets. All of the results suggest that our findings are more consistent with differences in sensitivity to brand reputation between franchisees and franchisors than other explanations.
Our study is the first to examine empirically how comparative reputational incentives between franchisees and franchisors affect compliance with workplace regulations. Unlike Cappelli and Hamori (2008) who compare human resource investments in training between franchise and independent businesses, we focus on ownership status within franchised companies.
This allows us to reexamine their argument about the effect of franchising on job quality by examining variation in compliance level within a chain that consists of company-owned and franchised establishments. In contrast to Krueger (1991) who studies the wage effects of franchising arising from monitoring, our study focuses on the free-riding problem arising from this type of ownership. Finally, our study examines whether the reputational factors that affect consumer choice in the restaurant hygiene case studied by Jin and Leslie (2009) extend to a social outcome like labor compliance which is less likely to have direct impact on customer choice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our data sources, descriptive statistics, and provides some institutional background regarding the fast food industry and the laws and enforcement agency that sets basic labor standards in it. Section III discusses a compliance model that compares compliance incentives between franchisees and franchisors. Section IV presents the Tobit and instrumental variable estimates of franchise ownership on compliance in the fast food industry and presents several robustness checks.
Section V revisits the alternative explanations for lower compliance among franchisees. Section VI concludes.
II. Data

A. Data sources
In order to estimate the effects of ownership on compliance, we use a sample consisting of the U.S. outlets of the Top 20 brands within the limited service sector of the eating and drinking industry, measured by each brand's total sales in 2003. The eating and drinking industry-an industry that includes everything from fast food outlets to the most upscale and exclusive restaurants in the country-employs close to nine million individuals. It is composed of two distinct sectors: full service restaurants and limited service (or fast food) restaurants which account for about 37 percent of the industry's employment or about 3.3 million workers. 2 2 Full-service restaurants (NAICS 72211) are defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as, "establishments primarily engaged in providing food services to patrons who order and are served while seated (i.e., waiter/waitress service) and pay after eating. These establishments may provide this type of food services to patrons in combination with selling alcoholic beverages, providing carry out services, or presenting live non-theatrical entertainment." Limitedservice eating establishments (NAICS 72221) are defined as "establishments primarily engaged in (1) providing food services where patrons generally order or select items and pa(2) selling a specialty snack or nonalcoholic 4 Since investigation strategies are determined by the Wage and Hour Division, there is a possibility that establishments with worse compliance outcomes have been investigated among the population of establishments. The non-random characteristic of investigations underlying WHISARD can introduce problems in estimating the true franchise ownership effect on compliance outcomes, which we discuss in Section IV-C.
If in the course of either type of workplace inspection, a violation of wage, hour, or child labor provisions is found, employers are liable for back pay to workers. As our dependent variable, we measure non-compliance with the FLSA by using back-wages owed to workers.
Back-wages are calculated as the difference between earnings to which an employee is legally entitled by the minimum wage, hour, and overtime requirements of the FLSA and the amount they were paid by the employer. For most of our empirical work, we measure total back-wages per investigation in a given outlet. Average back-wages per investigation for each brand during the study period varied considerably as shown in the final column of Table 1 .
Means and standard deviations of the dependent variables and key independent variables for the sample are presented in Table 2 . The mean total back-wages per investigation for a given outlet among the Top 20 is $1,350. We also provide two alternate measures of compliance: the incidence of employer non-compliance (measured as a dummy variable) and back-wages per employee paid in violation. About 40% of the 1768 investigations found one or more violations of minimum wage or overtime standards. The typical employee paid in violation of FLSA was owed about $178 in back-wages.
For each of the compliance measures, Table 2 presents difference-of-means tests between franchisee and company-owned outlets. The results indicate significant differences in compliance in the predicted direction at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels: mean total backwages per investigation are about $1,022 higher in franchisee-than in company-owned outlets while average probability of violation per investigation at company-owned outlets is 19% lower than that at franchised outlets. Equally striking, almost 80% of company-owned outlets among the Top 20 brands investigated by the WHD owed no back-wages to workers.
Table 2 also provides sample statistics for key independent variables used in the analysis.
Our measure of franchise ownership is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the outlet is franchisee-owned and zero if owned by the company (franchisor). About 95% of the restaurants investigated are franchisee-owned. This is slightly higher than the percent of franchisees reported in an industry measure (85%) and implies that the WHD investigations are somewhat skewed toward franchised outlets (QSR 2004) .
Differences in compliance levels may also be affected by different perceptions of inspection probabilities between company-owned and franchisees, which arise from past investigations. Accordingly, to hold the perceptions constant, we include the total number of inspections for all Top 20 outlets at a given five-digit zip code in the year prior to the investigation of a particular outlet. The average number of investigations for all Top 20 outlets in a given five-digit zip code during one year prior to the investigation for a particular restaurant is 0.54. This indicates that one investigation was conducted at any of the Top 20 outlets every two years, implying very low annual inspection probabilities at the five-digit zip code level.
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We include two variables to control for market-level competition effects on compliance.
Relevant agency theories predict that franchisors assign company-owned units to areas in which accessing sales information of local agents is difficult due to factors like severe sales fluctuations (John and Weitz, 1988; Norton, 1988) . Other agency theorists argue that franchised units are assigned to areas where monitoring efforts of local agents is difficult (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988) . Since competition tends to not only increase local agents' efforts but also make 5 Since the average number of Top 20 fast food outlets located in a given five-digit zip code area is 11.13, the average investigation rates for the Top 20 outlets in a given five-digit zip code during one year prior to the investigation for a particular restaurant is 4.85% (i.e. 100 0.54 / 11.13 * ). It should be noted that these rates only consider the five-digit zip code areas in which an inspection(s) occurred, excluding five digit-zip code areas which never received any inspection for Top 20 outlets. In other words, these rates do not reflect the fact that in some areas where one or more Top 20 outlets exist, no investigations were made. Indeed, the actual annual investigation rate for Top 20 outlets is 0.76% (Over the five-year period, 3,825 units out of about 502,000 Top 20 outlets were investigated). sales more volatile, franchisors have incentives to locate company-owned units in areas with more competition. At the same time, competition is likely to aggravate noncompliance by lowering profits of outlets. Hence, failure to control for these market-level competition effects could bias the estimated compliance differential downward. We control for these competition effects with two variables: the total number of Top 20 restaurants in a given five-digit zip code and the total number of restaurants with same brand as the observation in the five-digit area. The number of outlets in most areas is quite large: the average number of Top 20 fast food outlets located in a given five-digit zip code area is nearly 11, while the number of restaurants with the same brand is less than 2.
We control for outlet size by including the number of employees at the outlet in our models below. Franchising is the preferred form of ownership for larger-sized establishments because larger outlets are inherently more difficult to monitor and therefore benefit from diligent management by franchisees (Norton, 1988) . In addition, outlet size is regarded as related to the risk faced by an agent with regard to the capital investment made in the outlet (Lafontaine, 1992 (Lafontaine, , 1995 . In this scenario, since the agent would want investments in the outlet to be fully insured, franchisors tend to directly operate larger outlets. Considering that smaller establishments have been shown in general to provide worse working conditions (Brown, Hamilton and Medoff, 1990; Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Mendeloff et al., 2006) , the number of employees at the outlet could be an influential source of bias if we do not include it as a relevant proxy for outlet size in the regression. Table 2 indicates some significant differences by ownership for the main independent variables in the analysis. Interestingly, Top 20 company-owned restaurants tend to employ more workers than franchisee-owned restaurants. This finding is consistent with the argument that franchised outlets tend to be smaller than company-owned outlets because franchisees are likely more risk-averse regarding large capital investments at their outlets (Lafontaine 1992 (Lafontaine , 1995 .
III. Model
To guide our empirical analysis, we begin with a one-period labor compliance model similar to that used by Chang and Ehrlich (1985) where at the beginning of the representative period an expected-profit maximizing employer i with n number of identical outlets chooses either to pay earnings required by the statue to his/her employees or to underpay. At the end of the period, the government regulator targets investigations at the employer-level and investigates simultaneously all outlets of the employer who is one of the targets. Assume that each outlet j of the employer only uses homogeneous labor l in the production process, faces a given legally mandated wage w , and earns revenues r .
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The employer maximizes expected profits by choosing, at the outlet level, back-wages ( bw ) -the difference between earnings the employer should have paid and wages he/she actually paid to employees hired at each outlet -as follows 7 :
where:
( , ) Since all outlets of the employer are assumed to be identical, the expected profit function for the employer i becomes:
The first term of equation (2) is the standard expression of expected benefits from noncompliant behavior when the employer is not caught. The second term represents the expected costs of non-compliance, which is the probability that the employer receives an investigation times the sum of back-wages returned to employees and civil penalties imposed by the statute.
The model implies that an employer's incentive to comply depends on the amount of civil penalties and the possibility of being detected. In other words, the employer will commit more violations if, holding other things equal, the penalties are smaller and it is easier to escape detection. It should be also noted that the employer's incentive to comply is larger as the number of outlets the employer owns increases: employers who own more outlets inevitably face a greater probability of being detected than those with fewer outlets as long as the government investigates all outlets of a given employer (i.e. / 0
To illuminate different incentives driving compliance behavior for franchisees versus franchisors, we extend the model by simply adding both the royalty fees that franchisees pay to the franchisor, equivalent to a tax rate t ( 0 1 t < < ) on revenues, and the externality from potential deterioration of brand reputation due to the violation. Consider an economy where a franchisor c operates N number of total outlets for his / her brand and has k number of identical franchisees i who own i n outlets each. In this economy, consumers have homogenous preferences for the brand's product (including its reputation Q) and non-compliance. Then, the expected profit functions of each franchisee i and the franchisor c to be maximized are given respectively by:
Number of company-owned outlets;
Q : Brand reputation level, which is the weighted average of each outlet's reputation q that declines as total back-wages at the outlet increase (i.e. / 0 q bw ∂ ∂ < ) and which affects equally revenues of every outlet of the brand
The term r( Q ) in Equations (3) and (4) indicates that, if consumers become aware that any outlet of a given brand violated the FLSA, reputation of the brand will be lower, resulting in a reduction of consumption at every outlet of the brand. This reflects that all restaurants share the brand's reputation as a whole. Note also that the revelation of labor standards violations can affect brand reputation in two ways. First, consumers may reduce their consumption because they have preferences for labor standards compliance or more generally fair treatment of workers (e.g. Hiscox, Schwartz, and Toffel 2008) . Second, even if consumers are less sensitive to labor standards compliance than to issues like cleanliness and hygiene, there can still be indirect reputational consequences of non-compliance because of its impact on service quality. For example, requiring employees to work "off the clock" -e.g. clean up work stations after punching out for the day -could affect employees' morale and spillover to customer experience. 8 In this setting, the profit maximizing franchisee All that is required is a strong link between labor standards violations and quality diminution. For an outlet owned by franchisee i ;
For a company-owned outlet owned by franchisor c ;
Setting (5) equal to (6) leads to equation (7) that sets out the key conditions driving the back-wage differential (our measure of the severity of non-compliance) between a franchiseeand a company-owned restaurant.
Given several straightforward assumptions, 9
The first term of (7) underlies our primary hypothesis about comparative compliance because franchised and company-owned outlets share a common reputation (Q). However, the factors that contribute to the profits of an individual outlet do not necessarily correspond to those that determine the profits of the brand. This makes franchisees less interested in brand reputation than the franchisor because the franchisees profit only from the brand to the extent it increases their local profits whereas the franchisor benefits from increases in sales of all outlets in the chain. Furthermore, since consumers cannot distinguish between outlets in terms of ownership or compliance status, they judge them according to brand reputation only (Jin and Leslie, 2009 ).
the first term of equation (7) implies that the back-wage differential will be determined by the stake of franchisees in overall reputation which arises in turn from the number of outlets owned by a given franchisee as well as by the size of the royalty payment. The second term implies that the back-wage differential changes with the probability of inspection, arising from the number of outlets owned by a given franchisee relative to the number of company-owned outlets. Finally, the third term indicates that the differential is a function of the relative size of penalties faced by a franchisee-versus company-owned outlet. The asymmetric consumer information therefore plays a significant role in exacerbating underinvestments on brand reputation made by franchisees.
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Put somewhat differently, individual franchisees are more willing to accept negative effects of non-compliance on brand reputation because the number of outlets owned by a franchisee is much fewer than that of company-owned outlets and therefore his/her total revenues will be far less sensitive to potential deterioration of the brand reputation. Moreover, franchisees have a strong incentive to focus more on decreasing costs than increasing revenues due to royalty payments to the franchisor (e.g. each outlet of a franchisee earns revenues [1 ] t r − rather r ). This incentive can further promote franchisee free-riding on brand reputation. On the other hand, franchisors are more likely to be concerned about the deterioration because they lose far more revenues than franchisees. The desire to prevent erosion of brand reputation is why franchisors open company-owned outlets even if the profitability of company-owned outlets is not as high as that of franchisees because of monitoring problems.
IV. Empirical Results
A. Tobit results
Since a significant percent of employers comply with the FLSA and therefore pay no backwages, we estimate the determinants of compliance using the following Tobit specifications: In addition to the independent variables discussed in Section II, we control for regionspecific factors relating to compliance. Much of the literature argues that franchise ownership decision for a particular outlet is determined by geographic factors (Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2004; Yeap, 2006) . The best way to estimate true franchise ownership effect on compliance is to compare, in the same brand, the compliance measure between franchisee-owned and companyowned restaurants located at a particular region where both local product market and local labor market conditions are the same. Accordingly, we include three-digit zip code dummies in the regressions.
11 A number of five-digit zip code level demographic variables from the 2000
Economic Census are also included: population, population density, urban composition, racial composition, native composition, median household income, per-capita income, household income distribution, age distribution, crime rates, round trip commute time etc.
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11 Although five-digit zip code dummies would be an even better control for unobserved local market characteristics, we cannot use them because of small sample limitations at the five-digit level.
Finally, in some specifications, we include investigation year dummies to capture time-varying effects, the state minimum wage dummy variable indicating whether state minimum wage is above the federal minimum wage, and brand dummies to control brand-specific effects.
13 Table 3 reports the Tobit regression results. The first column contains the franchise ownership variable with the variable capturing the employer's belief about the probability of being detected at a five-digit zip code level, two measures for the number of Top 20 outlets at a five-digit zip code area, number of employees for a given outlet, state minimum wage indicator, four region dummies, and investigation year dummy variables. In the second column, a number of five-digit demographic are added. The third column includes the brand dummy variables.
Finally, the fourth column controls for region-specific effects by including three-digit zip code dummy variables in the regression.
In all specifications, the franchise ownership variable is positive and statistically significant at the .01 significance level. The result is robust across specifications, including column (4) which controls for all covariates including three-digit zip code dummies. In column (4), the back-wage differential between franchisee-owned and company-owned restaurants is $4,265, suggesting that holding other things constant at their mean, total back-wages found per investigation are over $4,265 higher at franchisee-owned restaurants than at the company-owned restaurants. This is over three times as large as the mean back-wages for the sample as a whole ($1,350) . It is particularly striking that the estimate for the franchise ownership variable is large and statistically significant at the .01 level even after controlling for all covariates including three-digit zip code dummies.
It is also worth noting other variable estimates. The variable for past inspections of all top 20 outlets in geographic proximity (our measure for employer beliefs regarding investigation 13 Inclusion of entries of 7 brands where all outlets are franchisee-owned (or company-owned outlets were never investigated) helps to estimate the franchise ownership variable more precisely by better identifying parameters of other independent variables when we include brand dummies in the regression probabilities) has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant. This suggests that, all else equal, compliance for a particular outlet improves as the number of past investigations increases in a given five-digit zip code. It appears that employers update the probability of being detected based on information about other investigations in the area.
The values of the competition variables have the expected signs but mixed statistical significance. The first variable (third row of Table 3 ), measuring the number of top 20 outlets in the area, has an expected positive sign and is significant in all but the final specification. This implies that greater competition (larger number of competitors) is associated with lower compliance. Interestingly, the sign of the second competition variable, the total number of same brand outlets in a five-digit zip code, is negative and borderline significant in most specifications.
The coefficient for the number of employees is negative and statistically significant when we exclude brand dummies, which is consistent with Brown, Hamilton and Medoff's (1990) argument that smaller establishments tend to provide worse working conditions. However, the sign of the variable is reversed in specifications (3) and (4), implying a positive relation between total back-wages and outlet size.
B. Robustness checks
An IV approach to estimating franchise effects IV
The ideal starting point for isolating the true franchise ownership effect on compliance would be to compare two identical restaurants located next to each other geographically, where one is franchisee-owned and the other is company-owned. So far, we have included potential covariates including a number of five-digit zip code demographic and three-digit zip code dummy variables for this purpose. Since our Tobit approach does not rely on an explicit source of exogenous variation in the franchising decision, however, there may be other differences between company-owned and franchised units that also impact the compliance measure.
Agency theories suggest that characteristics of a given outlet largely contribute to franchising. Of particular concern is variation in the capacity of franchisees to establish effective management practices or systems. The incentive to increase revenues is higher-powered at franchisee-owned than at company-owned outlets because managers in company-owned outlets are typically paid a fixed salary that does not depend on their outlet's revenues. On the other hand, a franchisor still needs to monitor the activities of franchisees, including their maintenance of brand standards. Accordingly, if a franchisor finds in the process of recruiting potential franchisees in a given local area a candidate who seems likely to engage in practices (e.g. setting up effective management systems) that facilitate the franchisor's monitoring, thereby providing the franchisor greater confidence in their ability to maintain standards relative to other franchisees, the franchisor will be more likely to grant a franchise even if other conditions would favor opening a company-owned outlet.
14 To obtain a consistent estimate of the true franchising effect, we therefore find an instrument that affects franchise ownership but not the compliance measure. For reasons Since better management systems are likely correlated with better compliance, omission of a relevant proxy capturing heterogeneity among the pool of franchisees with respect to outlet characteristics like management systems could result in a biased estimate of the franchise ownership effect.
described below, we use the percentage of the same brand outlets that are company-owned for the particular restaurant investigated at a three-digit zip code level as our instrument.
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Franchisors are capital constrained in their early stages and sell outlets to franchisees to raise capital (Caves and Murphy, 1976) . As this capital constraint relaxes over time, in order to hinder the deterioration of a brand reputation due to franchisees' free-riding behavior, franchisors strategically set a percentage of company-owned outlets in advance at the national level and actively achieve the target over time by adding and subtracting both franchisee-owned and company-owned outlets (Lafontaine and Shaw, 2005) . Based on this argument, for a given brand, the percentage of company-owned restaurants at a particular geographic level is likely strongly correlated with the franchisor's franchising strategy.
The percentage of company-owned restaurants for each brand at a given geographic area is unlikely to be correlated with the error term of our compliance measure. We directly include the number of past investigations, two competition variables, outlet size, brand-specific, and regionspecific factors that can affect back-wages for a given outlet in the regression. This enables us to control for other endogenous sources of variation in a given franchisor's franchising decision except for characteristics particular to each outlet such as the presence of better management systems. In addition, to ensure that the characteristics of the restaurants are not included in the instrument, we exclude the franchise status of the observation in calculating the percentage of company-owned restaurants of a particular brand at the three-digit zip code level. This makes the instrument unrelated to the compliance level of the observation.
We use IV Tobit with a two-stage least square estimator.
16 15 We construct the instrument at a three-rather than five-digit level because of sample size considerations. This leads to a decrease in total number of observations from 1,768 to 1,692, because of the cases where an outlet is the only one of the brand in the three-digit zip code. The top panel of Table 4 summarizes the basic sample statistics for the instrumental variable and the second panel presents IV Tobit results. Each specification is analogous to that in Table 3 . As in the standard Tobit regression results, the franchise ownership effect is positive and statistically significant, well below the .05 level in every specification. The striking difference from the Tobit results is the magnitude of the estimates for the franchise ownership variable. In every specification, the coefficient for the franchise ownership variable when IV Tobit is used is far larger than the comparable Tobit estimate. In specification (4), in particular, the back-wage differential between franchisee-owned and company-owned restaurants is $10,204, all other factors held constant. This value is about 2.5 times greater than the corresponding Tobit estimate. The dramatic increase in the size of this coefficient when we instrument for franchising suggests that the characteristics of restaurants we fail to control for in the Tobit regression influence both franchise ownership status and the compliance level.
Moreover, the IV estimate may imply that franchisors grant franchises to operators who have better management systems at locations where creating a company-owned outlet would otherwise be favorable.
Test statistics for the instrumental variable listed in specifications (3) and (4) allow us to determine which estimation result best represents true franchise ownership effects. From the first-stage results shown in the bottom panel (C), we find that the estimated coefficient of the 16 We also used an IV Tobit estimator with maximum likelihood except for the specification analogous to (4) in Table 4 . The estimates and conclusions are not qualitatively different when the structural equation is estimated by the maximum likelihood IV estimator. A table containing the maximum likelihood estimator is available on request.
instrument is significantly different from zero at the .001 level, which implies that percentage of company-owned outlets at a three-digit zip code area is a highly relevant instrument for franchise ownership status. The instrument is also strong enough for franchise ownership based on the Fstatistic. On the other hand, for the specification (3) and (4), the p-values for exogeneity tests for franchise ownership variable are 0.154 and 0.078 respectively, implying that the hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. While one might argue that the all the covariates including three-digit zip code dummies are therefore sufficient to control for other omitted bias, the large increase in the magnitude of the coefficients for franchise ownership variable still suggests the value of the IV approach. 
Alternative measures of compliance
As another robustness check, we use two alternative compliance measures.
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The left panel of Table 5 reports the Probit and implied marginal effects for the first measure while the right panel presents the Tobit and IV results for the second measure, which First, we use a dummy variable for the presence of one or more violations in an investigation. The second measure, back-wages per employee paid in violation, is created by dividing the total back-wages found per investigation by the total number of employees that were found to be owed backwages. Since we control for the number of employees for each outlet in the analysis, the latter dependent variable provides a scaled measure of the average severity of violations per affected worker.
focuses on the franchising variable of interest. 19 Specification (1) includes all independent variables except for three-digit zip code dummy variables in the regression whereas specification (2) controls for them as well. Similarly to Table 3 and 4 results, franchise ownership effects remain positive and statistically significant in every specification. The Probit estimate for the compliance dummy variable for specification (2), implies that the probability of finding a violation at franchised restaurants is about 24% higher than at company-owned restaurants, holding other variables constant at their mean. The large differences in the magnitude of effects between the Tobit and IV results also remain. As shown in the right panel, in every specification, the coefficient for the franchise ownership variable when IV Tobit is used is far larger than the comparable Tobit estimate.
C. Addressing potential sample selection bias
Since the WHD's complaint investigations create a tendency for establishments to be drawn disproportionately from the tail of the distribution that commits violations, we cannot rule out the possibility that the conditional mean of our full sample is biased towards the group which is more likely to commit violations.
We can test for the selection bias in our dataset by separating full sample into two types of investigation samples: directed and complaint. The dissimilar nature of the triggers for the two investigation types can be a crucial source to identify the selection bias: complaint investigations are more likely to be affected by sample selection bias than the directed investigations-which can be regarded as random within a selected industry group.
20 Table 6 reports Tobit and IV Tobit results for two separate samples with the similar specifications shown in Table 5 .
Accordingly, we compare the estimated franchising effect separately for complaint versus directed investigations to illuminate the extent of such biases.
21 20 In addition, there is no sign that the WHD sets investigation strategies based on franchise ownership information (which is not known a priori to them).
The magnitude of the franchisee effect obtained from the directed investigations sample is of particular interest. In the case of Tobit specification (2), the coefficient for the franchise ownership variable is $8,424. The magnitude of the estimate is about 2.2 times as large as that of the corresponding Tobit estimate with the full sample ($4,071).
Given that directed investigations are unlikely to be targeted at an employer-level, this estimate suggests very large back-wage differentials between two otherwise similar outlets differing only in terms of ownership. These dramatic differences are highlighted by a comparison of the incidence of full compliance (no FLSA violations) between franchised versus company-owned outlets: 95% of company owned outlets within the directed sample (versus 73% for franchised outlets).
21 Unlike Table 5 , specification (2) does not control for three-digit zip code variables because of small sample size at the 3-digit zip code level. In the directed investigation sample, for example, the number of three-digit zip code dummy variables is 340 whereas the number of company-owned outlets is only 34. The large number of three-digit zip code dummy variables relative to sample size creates convergence problem whenever we include in these zip code dummies in the regressions with Tobit or IV Tobit estimator.
In contrast, the coefficient for the franchise variable for the complaint investigations sample is still positive, but statistically insignificant in most specifications. Moreover, magnitudes in the estimates are far smaller than those in the estimates with the directed investigations sample. Consequently, the larger significant estimates for franchise ownership variable in the directed sample suggest the presence of even larger franchise effects in the less biased portion of the sample.
V. Explaining the company-owned / franchisee compliance gap
The estimates presented in the tables above suggest the presence of large and significant franchise ownership effects on compliance. In this section, we present evidence that the estimated gaps arise from differences in concern about brand reputation between franchisees and franchisors noted in Section III rather than other explanations described below.
First, as the second term of equation (7) in our theoretical model implies, the above franchise compliance differentials might be attributed to the argument that franchisors might believe that they face a higher probability of being detected by the government than do individual franchisees. Clearly, owners with more restaurants will face a higher probability of being caught than one with fewer outlets as long as WHD investigates randomly. Since franchisors own and operate more outlets than individual franchisees, their probability of detection by the government can be higher and, accordingly, they are more likely to comply with the FLSA than individual franchisees.
However, we have controlled for the impact of differing perceptions of inspection probabilities on estimated franchise effects through incorporation of the past inspection variables.
What is more, it is hard to account for the very large compliance differences found above given that the actual annual investigation rates for the Top 20 franchised-owned outlets and for Top 20 company-owned outlets are 0.72%, and 0.36% respectively.
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The following calculation is indicative: assume that each owner calculates the probability of being detected based on the number of outlets he/she owns relative to the annual number of investigations for the owner and that each franchisee owns only one outlet. If so, the average difference in probability of being detected between a franchisee-owned outlet and a companyowned outlet is 0.4%.
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One might still argue that the large compliance gaps may arise from the franchisor's concern about the higher probability of being investigated, particularly if penalties for a company-owned outlet are much higher than those for a franchised outlet. However, civil penalties for repeat violations and serious infractions of the FLSA imposed by the WHD are very low. Table 7 presents civil penalties assessed by the WHD on Top 20 outlets during the study If other components in the expected profit function developed in Section III are constant, these differences would lead to differentials in probability of a violation per investigation between franchisee-owned outlets and company-owned outlets. Compared to the estimates for marginal effects presented in left panel of Table 5 (23.9% in specification (2)), this magnitude is miniscule. The tiny size of the compliance differential arises because of the very low annual investigation rates in absolute terms. Thus, even though the annual investigation rates for a given franchisor is much larger relative to the rates for a franchisee, the chance of detection in a given year is close to zero for both types of outlets, leading to minimal expected differences in compliance arising from the probability of detection effects. 22 Over the five-year period, 3,183 units out of about 436,988 franchised outlets were investigated, whereas 238 units out of about 64,967 company-owned outlets were inspected. 23 Since we have the complete information on number of investigations and number of outlets by ownership for Top 20 brands, we can calculate the average of annual investigation rates for a franchised outlet and for a companyowned outlet per brand. Under these assumptions, the probability of being detected for a franchised outlet is 0.00000409 versus 0.0040780 for a company-owned outlet. Because the majority of franchisees own multiple units, the differences between our inspections probabilities are smaller than implied by the above calculation.
period. Civil penalties were applied to only 28 cases of the 2,247 total violation cases and 21 cases out of the 67 repeated violation cases. Furthermore, the maximum penalty paid by a Top 20 outlet was $3,600.
A second explanation for the compliance gaps relates to monitoring problems arising at company-owned outlets. As both owner and manager, franchisees have a strong incentive to expend effort in supervising and monitoring workers because they receive the residual profit generated by the outlet. On the other hand, a manager of a company-owned outlet is usually paid a fixed salary and his/her actions are not perfectly observed by the franchisor, thereby providing less incentive to closely supervise employees. Since franchisors address the monitoring problem by using efficiency wages in company-owned outlets (Krueger, 1991) , the higher efficiency wages provided by company-owned outlets may lead to better compliance at company-owned outlets than at franchisee-owned outlets.
There is an additional way to distinguish between the reputational and monitoring explanations in our franchising effects. The monitoring story leads to different predictions about the relationship between the magnitude of the franchise effect and franchisees' scale (i.e. number of outlets each franchisee owns). A multi-unit franchisee faces the same monitoring problem posited by Krueger as it grows in scale and geographic scope. They should therefore adopt efficiency wages to internalize the problem. Specifically, a monitoring story would predict that as franchisees grow in terms of the number of units they own or the geographic dispersion of their operations, the back-wages they owe relative to those at comparable company-owned units should diminish because they adopt efficiency wages to deal with monitoring problems. This would also suggest that compliance levels of multi-unit franchisees would differ from those of single-unit or very small franchisees. In contrast, if the brand reputation story holds, one would not expect to find appreciable differences in the incentives to comply among franchisees of different scale until a franchisee becomes very large and operates in multiple states, thereby giving it comparable incentives to prevent brand image deterioration.
In order to test for the presence of franchisee scale effects, we re-estimate compliance models, breaking franchised outlets into several groups that differ by the number of outlets owned by a given franchisee. Each franchisee group's coefficients, relative to company-owned outlets, are presented in Table 8 . The outlets owned by single-unit franchisees (SUFs) and multiunit franchisees (MUFs) owe higher levels of back-wages than comparable company-owned outlets for all groups except for the outlets operated by very large MUFs who own more than 110 units in multiple states. We also see in the lower panel of Table 8 that back-wages for any other MUFs (group A, B, and C) excluding the very large MUFs operating in multiple states (group D)
are not significantly different from that for SUFs.
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These findings are consistent with the brand reputation story and inconsistent with monitoring explanations.
On the other hand, the coefficient for group D is significantly different from that of each of the other franchisee groups.
25
It is important to also consider the argument that differences in compliance level may arise from tighter budget constraints for franchisees. Since franchisees pay a portion of revenues to
In addition, the finding that back-wages for MUFs who own between 11 units (mean of this group) and 173 units (maximum of this group) in only a single-state are not significantly different from those for SUFs is also counter to a story that differentials in compliance arise as a result of differences in the probability of detection.
their franchisor, they have strong incentives to minimize costs by hiring lower productivity workers at the expense of revenues. If the argument is true, lower productivity of workers hired by franchisees relative to those hired at company-owned outlets would require very large productivity differences to explain the estimates presented in tables above. The presence of such large and unmeasured productivity differences within three digit zip code areas seems implausible given Krueger's (1991) empirical finding that workers' characteristics were almost identical (e.g. years of schooling and high school grade point average) in his studies of fast food workers. Of course, the much tighter budget constraint for franchisees itself might directly lead to worse compliance. 26 However, it is also hard to explain the finding presented in Table 8 that back-wages for SUFs have no significant difference from those for MUF groups B and C who likely face less restrictive budget constraints.
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VI. Conclusion
A significant literature (Rubin, 1978; Mathewson and Winter, 1985; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2005) concerns different investments in brand reputation between franchisees and franchisors.
Outlets in a chain share the same consumer reputation of the brand as a whole. On the other hand, franchisees profit only from the brand to the extent it increases their local profits unlike a franchisor who benefits from increases in sales of all outlets in the chain induced by the brand reputation. Hence, the franchisees under-invest in various activities that foster brand reputation relative to the franchisor.
In this paper, we have found that compliance levels estimated by several reasonable measures with minimum wage and overtime laws are significantly lower at franchisee-owned outlets than at company-owned outlets in the fast-food industry in the U.S. And we have presented a series of evidence that these compliance differentials are more consistent with differences in the reputational incentives arising from franchise ownership structure than other explanations of firm behavior.
Nevertheless, there still remains an important question unexplained: Given the resources that franchisors devote to protecting their brand through monitoring the activities of franchisees, why would they tolerate franchisees' human resource policies that could jeopardize brand reputation?
A glib answer would be that, prior to this study, franchisors were unaware of substantial differences in compliance behavior between franchisee and company-owned operations. While this might be true, it begs the fundamental question: If franchisors seek to protect reputation, any activity that might jeopardize it should be fair game for monitoring. Yet most franchisors do not monitor payroll practices of their franchisees (and explicitly note in most franchise agreements that such activities are the domain of franchisee and not the franchisor).
A deeper answer is that franchisors fear the consequence of asserting greater oversight of franchisees in regard to their operational policies because of the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Vicarious liability refers to liability imposed upon one party because of the actions of another. Vicarious liability affects the degree that in a principal-agent relationship the principal attempts to influence behavior by asserting more direct control on the agents' activities (Arlen and MacLeod 2005) . Franchisors would expose themselves to a wider set of liabilities (and potential costs) if they begin to treat franchisee employees as their own: Monitoring payroll records or imposing closer monitoring scrutiny could be interpreted as evidence of a "masterservant" relationship and therefore expose the franchisor to tort liabilities going far beyond the employment relationship itself (for example, suits by customers arising from a franchisee employee who failed to warn customers of a wet floor that led to a fall and injury).
Reluctance to monitor franchisee behavior is consistent with behavior documented in other research. Rebitzer (1995) found that in the wake of a series of major petrochemical explosions and worker fatalities linked to the use of independent contractors to undertake "turn-around" operations on petrochemical plants, those companies sought to distance themselves from the training and supervision of independent contractors in their plants who were hired to provide short term labor in order to change the mix of products produced by the facilities. Despite the potentially devastating impact of improperly performed work, major petrochemical companies sought to insulate themselves from asserting "master-servant" relationships with turnaround contractors in order to avoid tort claims arising from those contractors' activities. Jin and Leslie (2009) findings concerning the gap between franchisee and company-owned restaurant hygiene prior to the imposition of mandatory grade cards can be similarly understood through the lens of vicarious liability, even given the clear costs of such behavior to the brand and franchisor.
Thus, although there could be reputation effects arising from their franchisees' poor compliance, franchisors' reluctance to actively monitor them arises because such behavior could potentially subject them to even higher costs arising from tort liability. This would explain the persistence of large compliance gaps between franchisee-and company-owned outlets.
The empirical evidence of this study also has important policy implications. Like other regulatory agencies in the US Department of Labor, the Wage and Hour Division has devoted significant resources to enforcement in industries with large numbers of low wage workers and high levels of franchising like the fast-food sector, but has paid little attention to franchise ownership in constructing its enforcement strategies. Given that the WHD operates with limited investigation resources, the evidence provided here can provide it and other agencies regulating low wage workplaces with new means to establish and implement better strategies to improve compliance based on ownership structure. More generally, regulators might benefit from more explicit recognition of how ownership and industry structure may affect business behavior and compliance incentives in fashioning enforcement strategies.
including disclaimers and waivers of control within the franchise agreement. Too often, the issues of franchisor liability for franchisee actions are covered in standardized clauses covering liability and indemnification that are inserted into franchise agreements without much thought. However, a carefully written agreement will seek to retain control in certain vital areas (financial reporting, for instance), while disclaiming or waiving any degree of control over certain day to day operations of a franchisee that might give rise to liability." (Dunn 2009 
